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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
15568 
WILLIE MAE WALKER, aka 
DELL WALKER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with one count of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute 
for value in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) 
(Supp. 1973). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty 
of one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute for value on September 1 and 2, 1977, 
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and 
for Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Peter F •. Leary, 
presiding. On September 26, 1977, appellant was sentenced for 
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the indeterminate term (up to fifteen years) in the Utah 
State Prison. Appellant has since been released from 
custody on a $25,000 bail bond. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict 
and judgment of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In early 1976, Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff 
Michael George received information from a confidential 
informant (CI No. 20) that the informant had purchased 
heroin from one Del Walker, aka Willie Mae Walker, at 
511-513 West Second South in Salt Lake City, known as 
Del's Cafe. Later, on or about July 7, 1976, another 
confidential informant (CI No. 30) informed Officer George 
that heroin had been observed personally by the informant 
on the premises of Del's Cafe and the informant described 
to Officer George in detail the location and amounts of 
the controlled substance. A few days later on July 13, 
1976, CI No. 30 again was an eyewitness to unlawful drug 
trafficking on the premises (State's Exhibit A). 
On July 14, 1976, Officer George swore out an 
affidavit for search warrant before Salt Lake City Judge 
M. D. Jones "on the persons of Del Walker and a male persoo 
-2-
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known only as "Billie," [Robert Westley] on the premises 
known as 511 and 513 West 2nd South, adjoining buildings known 
as Del's Cafe and rooms apurtenant thereto ••• 
The two buildings at 511-513 West Second South 
are actually one building that shares a party wall and 
has one entrance that serves both sides of the premises. 
The common structure is under the supervision of appellant 
(Tr.66). The buildings were not licensed or used as 
apartments nor were there separate paying tenants living 
there (Tr.66,176-177). The officers who conducted the 
search, therefore, had no prior notice of the upper floor's 
use for occupancy by approximately six persons. Appellant 
allowed her friends to live on the upper floor free of 
charge when they did not have money for rent (Tr.66,82-83, 
176-177). 
Officer George was able to give credibility to the 
two confidential informants' information when he swore out 
the affidavit. This credence was based on past experience 
by CI No. 20 who had provided reliable and verified informa-
tion to police officers during the prior six months which 
resulted in several arrests and one conviction. Confidential 
Informant No. 30 had made a previous "controlled purchase" 
of heroin and had provided officers with valuable and 
verified information such as telephone numbers, names and 
addresses of known narcotics dealers (State's Exhibit A). 
-3-
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On the basis of the above affidavit, a search 
warrant was issued and on the same day--July 14, 1976--at 
approximately 8:30 p.m., several police officers arrived 
at Dels' Cafe, 511-513 West Second South (Tr.76-77). Two 
officers stationed themselves at the bar of the cafe to 
keep the appellant and Fifi, the cook, from sounding a 
buzzer that would ring upstairs. While one officer 
positioned himself outside at the door, other officers 
including Jim Duncan, Deputy Sheriff; Randall Anderson, 
Deputy Sheriff; and George; climbed the stairs to the 
upper floor (Tr.39,78,93). 
According to the testimony at trial, the upper 
floor consisted of three bedrooms, one office, one storage 
room, one bathroom, and one washroom (Tr.39-40). None of 
the three bedrooms had separate bathroom or kitchen 
facilities and all of appellant's occupants shared a 
common living room--pool table area and private upstairs 
bar (Tr.40). Common hallways, washroom and bathroom 
were also jointly used by the occupants (Tr.40). The only 
room with a functioning lock was the room where the heroin 
was discovered (Tr.l70). Thus, the other six rooms were 
open and freely accessable to all the occupants. 
The police found the office locked with "two or 
three locks, " one of which was a deadbolt (Tr.40), and 
-4-
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broke down the door. Upon searching the room, they discovered 
in a night stand a brown prescription-type bottle filled 
with 56 balloons of a substance later ascertained as heroin 
(Tr.41,105). The heroin was estimated to have a street value 
of approximately $1,680 (Tr.48). Also found in the nighstand 
were two envelopes addressed to Willie C. Walker at 511 West 
Second South (Tr.66-69; Exhibit SP). Woman's furs, jewelry, 
clothing, a cash box, cash and business receipts were also 
discovered in the room--all of which were later identified 
as belonging to appellant (Tr.53,54,80,170). The officers who 
were present, according to their testimony, did not find any 
men's clothing or shaving gear in the room (Tr.54,81,87,189). 
However, appellant testified that clothing and toiletries 
belonging to Robert Westley were in the room (Tr.l69). 
The officers apprehended Robert Westley, who was 
dressed in pajamas, in another room (Tr.94-95). Four balloons 
of heroin were found on Westley's person. 
The officers read appellant her Miranda rights 
(Tr.66,81), and questioned her regarding the room where the 
suspected heroin was found. Appellant indicated that she had 
control over the second floor of the cafe, that none of the 
rooms were being rented at that time and that she had 
exclusive control over the locked room in which the drugs 
were discovered (Tr.66,82-83,177,189). Appellant also told 
the officers that she had the only key to that room (Tr.82-83, 
-5-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
189), which she claimed she used as a business office 
(Tr.B3). 
At trial, appellant denied telling the police 
officers that she had exclusive control over the office 
and also denied that she had the only key saying instead 
that she merely had a key to the closet (Tr.l82). 
By appellant's own testimony, one of the occupants, 
Louie Shelton, was a user of heroin (Tr.J85). She also 
claimed that she knew Westley would often enter the office 
with bad headaches, lock the door, remain there for about 
45 minutes, then exit feeling much better (Tr.l71-172). 
At the trial, appellant testified she did not use heroin 
herself but she recognized the balloons inside the brown 
prescription bottle (Exhibit 3P) as being the common method 
of packaging heroin. She testified, "You'll see it on the 
floors, on the streets, every place. But I hadn't seen 
them in that room. I see empty ones all the time right 
now." (Tr.l84-185). The jury returned a unanimous verdict 
against the defendant on September 2, 1977. Judgment on 
the verdict was entered by the judge September 26, 1977. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE 
DEFENDANT COULD BE CONVICTED OF THE CRIME OF POSSESSION OF 
NARCOTICS WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. 
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The theory upon which the State has proceeded 
in this case is constructive possession. Generally 
courts have held that such may be proved by circumstantial 
evidence. In State v. Krohn, 15 Or.App. 63, 514 P.2d 1359 
(1973), the court said: 
"To prove constructive 
possession of a dangerous drug 
or narcotic, the state must show 
that the defendant knowingly 
exercised control of or the right 
to control the unlawful substance 
State v. Moore, 97 Or.App.Adv.Sh. 
930, 511 P.2d 880 (1973), but this 
may be shown by circumstantial 
evidence." 514 P.2d at 1362. 
See also People v. Lopez, 169 Cal.App.2d 344, 337 P.2d 570 
(1959); People v. Showers, 68 Cal.Rptr. 459, 440 P.2d 939 
(1968). The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that dominion 
and control neither means that the drug be found on the 
person of the accused nor that the accused must have had 
sole and exclusive possession of the narcotic. State v. 
Winters, 16 Utah 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872 (1964); State v. 
Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 135, 514 P.2d 800 (1973). 
Appellant relies on Mulligan v. State and Richardson 
v. State, Wyo., 513 P.2d 180 (1973) 1 to support her theory 
1 In Mulligan, supra, the Wyoming court applies a very strict 
standard on the use of circumstantial evidence in narcotics 
cases. The standard of proof for circumstantial evidence 
was such that it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis 
other than that of guilt. This part of Mulligan was 
specifically overruled by the court in Blakely v. State, 
Wyo., 542 P.2d 857 (1975), where the court adopted the 
concept that circumstantial evidence should be evaluated 
by the jury on the same basis as direct evidence. 
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that possession or control of the drugs must be shown to 
be exclusive before she can be convicted of unlawful 
possession of narcotics. However, contrary to the 
assertions of the appellant, there was sufficient evidence 
presented by the State at the trial that defendant's 
possessionand control of the drugs was exclusive. The 
room in which the heroin was found was referred to by the 
prosecution as "O" (Tr.39), since the room was purportedly 
a business office. See Exhibit IP, a diagram of the second 
floor of Del's Cafe. The defense, however, referred to the 
particular room in which the drugs were found as "room 6." 
The defense counsel at the trial had his own diagram of the 
second floor to which defense witnesses were directed, on 
which the rooms were numbered. This diagram, exhibit 9D 
at the trial, did not come up with the rest of the record 
on appeal. However, it may be inferred from the testimony 
of the defense witnesses, from the closing arguments of 
the counsel for the defense (Tr.211,212), and appellant's 
brief, page 2, that "room 6" was indeed the room in which 
the drugs were discovered by the police officers. 
The appellant tries to show that Robert Westley, 
also known as "Billie," was living in, or had access to 
the room where the narcotics were found, and thus that 
the defendant's possession or control over the heroin 
was not exclusive. There was no substantial evidence 
-8-
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presented at the trial that Westley had any kind of control 
over that room. The testimony of one of the arresting 
officers, Randall Anderson, was that the room was locked 
with at least two locks, one of which was a dead bolt 
type of lock (Tr.40). Inside they found the heroin, as 
well as business records, a cash register tray and some 
money (Tr.53,54,80). Also discovered in the room were 
woman's clothing, jewelry and furs, all of which the 
defendant admitted were her's (Tr.BO,l70). In the nightstand 
in which the heroin was found were also discovered by the 
officers two envelopes, which were both addressed to the 
defendant (Tr.41,66-69). There were no articles of men's 
clothing or shaving gear found in the room (Tr.54,81,87,189). 
Upon being examined at the trial concerning his confrontation 
with the defendant at the time of the arrest, Officer Randall 
Anderson testified according to the following: 
"Q. (By Mr. Austin) Where did 
you come into contact with her on that 
day. 
A. Outside the office area there. 
Q. Who was present when you were 
talking to her? 
A. Myself and Deputy George. 
Q. Did you read her her rights? 
A. Deputy George previously had 
given her her rights. 
Q. Did you ask her any questions 
at that time? 
A. Yes, I did. 
-9-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. What questions did you 
ask her? 
A. I asked her if she had any 
rent receipts for the other rooms 
upstairs. 
Q. What was her response to you 
at that time? 
A. She stated no she did not, 
that she had friends who stayed in 
there periodically. However, they 
did not rent the rooms. I then stated, 
'In other words they're under your 
control?' She said, 'That's right.'" 
(Tr.66). 
Officer Michael George also spoke with the 
defendant at the time of her arrest. He testified as 
follows: 
"Q. What questions did you ask 
her regarding narcotics that you found 
upstairs; alleged narcotics? 
A. The first question I asked 
her is who was slaying in the room, 
the second on the right, which was 
described where Deputy Anderson had 
found the narcotics. She stated at 
that time no one was staying there. 
That was her business office, and 
she had control over the office area. 
Q. Did you ask her anything 
further regarding that room? 
A. I did. She stated that she 
had people staying there from time 
to time. No one stayed in there 
for the past few days. She stated 
that a party by the name of Billy 
had been staying there, but stated 
Billy was staying in her bedroom; 
the first one on the left. I asked 
her who 'Billy' was. She stated 
that's her boyfriend who was later 
identified as Robert Westley. 
-10-
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Q. Did you ask her regarding 
any keys to rooms on the other 
floors? 
A. I did. 
Q. What question did you ask? 
A. She stated she had control 
over all the rooms. She had the keys. 
Q. She had the keys? Did you 
ask her regarding the keys to this 
particular room where the alleged 
narcotics were found? 
A. Yes, sir; I did. She 
stated that she had the only key 
to that door. That was the business 
office at that time." (Tr.82,83). 
Under rebuttal direct examination by the 
prosecution Officer George testified again concerning 
statements made by the defendant at the time of her 
arrest: 
"Q. When you had this conversa-
tion with the defendant in this case, 
after you read her her Hiranda rights, 
did you ask her who had control of 
that room? 
A. I did. 
Q. What was her response? 
A. She stated she had exclusive 
control to that room, and she had the 
only key to that room. 
Q. You had a conversation 1.-rith 
her regarding the man who's been 
identified as Robert Westley? 
A. I did. 
Q. What was the substance of 
that conversation? 
A. Well, when I asked her who was 
staying in the room that I have just 
described where the narcotics were 
found, I asked her if anybody was 
staying there. She stated nobody was 
staying there and nobody had been 
-11-
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staying there for the last few 
days. However, her boy friend, 
Billy, had been staying there a 
few days ago." {Tr.l89). 
The defendant went on to tell Offic~r George that Billie, 
i.e., Robert \vestley, was "staying in her bedroom; the 
first one on the left." {Tr.82). This is exactly the 
room in which Officer Jim Duncan testified he found 
Robert Westley in his pajamas {Tr.94,95). The room in 
which the heroin was discovered was the second room on 
the right, at the top of the stairs {Tr.82). See also 
Exhibit lP. 
Apparently there was some confusion on the part 
of the defense as to who exactly did live in room 6, where 
the heroin was found. At the trial under direct examination 
by defense counsel the defendant testified that Robert 
Westley lived in room 7 rather than room 6 {Tr.l65). 
Evidently the defendant changed her mind as to who was 
living in room 6, in which the drugs were found, some time 
prior to the trial. In an "affidavit in support of motion 
to suppress search warrant" {R.37), June 21, 1977, the 
defendant, under oath, testified that one Gwendolyn Faye 
Campbell lived in the room, which the defense referred to at 
the trial as "room 6." The defendant at the trial, however, 
testified that Gwendolyn Faye Campbell lived in roo~ 4 {Tr. 
166). The only witness for the defense who testified that 
Westley lived in room 6 was Chalmers Hood. However, Hood 
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also testified that he did not arrive in Salt Lake City 
until September of 1976 (Tr.llB). The arrest took 
place on July 14, 1976. Officer George testified that 
Hood was absolutely not present at that address when 
the search warrant was executed (Tr.lBB). Hood could not 
possibly have known where Westley was living at the time 
of the arrest. All of the evidence presented by the 
State at the trial points to the fact that the defendant 
had exclusive control of the particular room where the 
heroin was found on July 14, 1976. 
Appellant tries to infer that Westley had 
control of the room by giving evidence to show that the 
heroin found on the person of Westley was similar to 
that found in the room. It does not follow from that 
evidence that Westley had any kind of control over the 
room, or access to the drugs therein. The respondent does 
not find the evidence compelling that the drugs found on 
Westley and those found in the appellant's business office 
were from the same stock. However, even if they did come 
from the same stock, the more logical explanation as to 
how Westley obtained the heroin, which was found on him, 
is that he got it from the appellant, with whom he had a 
romantic relationship, according to her testimony at the 
trial (Tr.l69). Simply because Westley was found with 
drugs on his person which may have come from the appellant's 
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own stock which she kept in her business office does 
not mean he had any kind of joint control over the drugs 
with her. The evidence shows that she possessed the 
heroin in a large quantity with an intent to distribute 
(Tr.69,85,99). The fact of Westley's possession of 
such drugs is simply evidence lhat she did indeed 
distribute those narcotics which she kept locked in 
her office. 
There is sufficient circumstantial evidence 
to support the finding of the jury that the drugs were 
held with an intent to sell and distribute. The amount 
of heroin discovered was an unusually large quantity. 
All three arresting officers who testified at the trial 
gave their opinions that the heroin was held with an 
intent to sell (Tr.69,85,99). State v. Bankhead, supra 
at 803, points out that circumstantial evidence may be 
used to prove that the accused possessed the narcotics 
for sale rather than for her individual use. 
There was sufficient evidence presented at the 
trial court from which the jury could conclude that the 
defendant was guilty. This Court stated in State v. 
Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977): 
-14-
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"The judging of the credi-
bility of the witnesses and the 
weight of the evidence is exclusively 
the prerogative of the jury. Conse-
quently we are obliged to assume that 
the jury believed those aspects of the 
evidence, and drew those inferences 
that reasonably could be drawn 
therefrom, in the light favorable 
to the verdict. In order for the 
defendant to successfully challenge 
and overturn a verdict on the ground 
of insufficiency of the evidence, it 
must appear that upon so viewing the 
evidence, reasonable minds must 
necessarily entertain a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime. In applying the rules above 
stated to the instant case, we are not 
persuaded that the verdict should be 
overturned." 565 P.2d at 68. 
The Wilson case involved a prosecution for 
possession of heroin with intent to distribute for value. 
The defendant testified that he was out of town when the 
alleged sale took place, while the prosecution's witness 
testified that she had made the purchase from defendant 
in Salt Lake City on the date in question. The Court 
stated that it was a proper function of the jury to 
determine which of these obviously conflicting testimonies 
it would believe. 
The position of this Court concerning the review 
of the sufficiency of evidence is further stated in State 
v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976): 
-15-
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"This court has long upheld 
the standard that on an appeal 
from conviction the court cannot 
weigh the evidence nor say what 
quantum is necessary to establish 
a fact beyond a reasonable doubt 
so long as the evidence given is 
substantial. Further, this court 
has maintained that its function 
is not to determine guilt or 
innocence, the weight to give 
conflicting evidence, the credi-
bility of witnesses, or the weight 
to be given defendant's testimony." 
554 P.2d at 218. 
The jury in the instant case has obviously chosen 
to give more weight to the testimonies of the police officers!, 
than to that of the defendant. In this case, the testimony 
of the witnesses for the prosecution afforded the jury a 
substantial basis on which they could reasonably find that 
the defendant constructively possessed the heroin by virtue 
of her exclusive control over the room in which it was found. I 
Their determination of guilt should remain undisturbed. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO ALLOW 
TESTIMONY FROM THE WITNESS JAMES HOUSLEY THAT ROBERT 
WESTLEY OCCUPIED THE ROOM IN WHICH THE HEROIN WAS 
DISCOVERED. 
The appellant tries to show that Robert Westley 
did have occupancy or control over the room in which the 
-16-
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heroin was found on July 14, 1976. Her argument is 
unsound on several points. Defense counsel claims 
this case is a Brady v. Maryland problem, and that the 
prosecution attempted to cover up evidence and also that 
the prosecution removed certain evidence from the 
courtroom during the trial. Appellant neglects to point 
out in her brief that the evidence which was removed from 
the courtroom was the four balloons of heroin found on 
Westley, Exhibit 7D. This was done as a result of a 
misunderstanding between Mr. Leedy, counsel for the 
defense, and Mr. Austin, the prosecutor (Tr.57-63). The 
four balloons were quickly returned to the courtroom once 
it was apparent what had happened (Tr.63). The court ruled 
that the chain of evidence for the defense was not broken 
(Tr.63). 
This case is definitely not similar to Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 u.s. 83 (1963). In Brady, the defense counsel 
had requested the prosecution to allow him to examine the 
extrajudicial statements of the defendant's companion. 
Several of these were shown to him; but one in which the 
companion admitted the actual killing was withheld by the 
prosecution and did not come to the petitioner's notice 
until after he had been tried, convicted and sentenced. In 
the case now before the Court there is absolutely no evidence 
-17-
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that the prosecution withheld any evidence during the 
trial, which might be favorable to the appellant, nor is 
there evidence that the defense counsel made any request 
for such evidence, as had been made in the Brady case. 
Housley had visited Del's Cafe and had seen Westley! 
I 
getting out of bed but was unable to say exactly when, other I 
than that he had known Westley "from late December of 1975 
until sometime in the summer of 1976" and that the date of 
his visit was "prior to the time that Dell was arrested on 
this charge." (Tr.l33). Housley was not a prosecutor for 
the county attorney's office at the time he visited Del's 
Cafe and saw Westley (Tr.l30). 
The evidence which the defense was trying 1:o 
introduce through Housley's testimony was properly excluded 
by the judge. The issue here is whether Westley had control 
or occupancy of the room in which the heroin was found on 
July 14, 1976. Housley knew nothing as to this issue. 
Jones on Evidence, 6th Ed., sec. 4.1, p. 379, states: 
"A witness having no knowledge 
of the proposition which is the 
subject of proof could hardly be 
expected to give relevant testimony." 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 45, give the judge 
the discretion to exclude evidence if he feels that its 
probative value is outweighed by other considerations. 
See also McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence, 2d 
ed., pp. 438-440. This discretionary power of the judge 
I 
I 
I 
__,.,__ 
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to exclude evidence is very broad, Martin v. Safeway Stores, 
Inc., 565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1977); Williams v. Queen Fisheries, 
2 Wash.App. 691, 469 P.2d 583 (1966); Olson v. Hardware 
Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 45 Wis.2d 569, 173 N.W.2d 599 
(1970). If there was any probative value in the excluded 
testimony of Housley the trial judge evidently felt it was 
outweighed by its remoteness in time, and the inability of 
Housley to say when his visit took place. Evans v. Gaisford, 
122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1952), held that remoteness of 
the evidence to the issue is one of the elements the judge 
can take into consideration in weighing its probative value. 
The trial judge here did not abuse his discretion in sustaining 
the objection to Housley's testimony, which would have had 
little if any probative value in showing that the appellant 
did not have exclusive control over her locked office in 
which the heroin was kept on July 14, 1976. 
At the trial the counsel for the defense made a 
proffer of evidence, concerning the testimony of Housley 
which was excluded by the judge (Tr.l33-134). This proffer 
was not recorded and is nowhere contained in the record. 
The only place the proffer is mentioned is Appellant's Brief. 
This, however, is insufficient in an appeal. The Utah Court 
in Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385 P.2d 155 (1963), 
stated: "This court cannot consider facts stated in the 
-19-
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briefs which may be true but absent in the official record," 
See also Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters, Inc., 123 Utah 
215, 257 P.2d 540 (1953); Skyline v. Datacap, 545 P.2d 512 
(Utah 1976). Appellant's proffer should not be considered 
by the court in this appeal by virtue of its not being 
properly within the record. 
A. EVEN IF SUCH TESTIMONY FROM HOUSLEY SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, IT WAS A HARMLESS ERROR FOR THE COURT 
TO REFUSE TO ALLOW IT. 
by 
to 
Even if the testimony of Housley had been admitted I 
the court, and it was shown that Westley had had access 
or occupancy of the room previous to the execution of the I 
search warrant no prejudicial error would have been committee.! 
Were this the case, the ruling of the lmver court should stiLl 
stand, under Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-l (1953). The fact I 
that other persons may have had access to the room in which I 
the narcotics were found will not necessarily disturb a 
finding that there was constructive possession of the 
narcotics by the defendant. The Illinois court in People 
v. Embry, 20 Ill.2d 331, 169 N.E.2d 767 (1960), said: 
"In People v. Mack, 12 Ill.2d 
151, 145 N.E.2d 609, we held that 
where narcotics were found in an 
apartment which had been rented to 
the defendant, the element of 
possession was established, in 
spite of the fact that other persons 
-20-
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had access to the apartment. 
The proof here that defendant 
paid the rent on the apartment 
and was present when the drugs 
were found therein is sufficient 
to establish that he was in 
possession of them, in spite of 
the fact that other persons were 
likewise present at the time." 
169 N.E.2d at 769. 
The Illinois Court held similarly in People v. Nettles, 
23 Ill.2d 306, 178 N.E.2d 361 (1961). In Nettles, when 
the police arrested the defendant he told them "anything 
you find in the apartment is mine." The defendant was 
convicted even though there were three others present in 
his apartment at the time of the search. The statement of 
the defendant in Nettles is similar to those made by the 
defendant in the instant case when she told the arresting 
officer that she was in control of the entire premises on 
the second floor and in exclusive control of the room 
containing the drugs (Tr.66,82,83,189). 
In State v. Villavicencio, 108 Ariz. 518, 502 
P.2d 1337 (1972), the defendant was found guilty of 
possession of drugs which had been hidden in a box found 
next to his apartment building. The court affirmed and 
ruled that the defendant constructively possessed the 
drugs even though the area was "completely open and 
accessible to anybody who would want to walk through." 
-21-
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The court said "Exclusive control of the place in which 
the narcotics are found is not necessary." Supra at 1339. 
Numerous other cases support this proposition. 
There is also a line of cases in which courts 
have held that where drugs were found on premises of 
which the defendant was in nonexclusive possession, 
the fact that they were found among or near his personal 
belongings was a circumstance sufficient to link him with 
possession of such drugs. In People v. Flores, 155 Cal.App.k 
347, 318 P.2d 65 (1957), the court affirmed the conviction of 
the defendant for possession of heroin. The drugs had been 
discovered in the pocket of a jacket in a closet along with 
two blank applications one of v-'hich bore the defendant 1 s 
name. A pair of pants belonging to the defendant was also 
found in the closet. The proximity of belongings of the 
defendant to the drugs, even though "quite a few people had 
access to the house" was sufificent circumstantial evidence 
upon which the jury could have found the defendant guilty. 
In the instant case the heroin was found in a nightstand al~l 
containing two envelopes which were addressed to the 
defendant (Tr.41,66-69). In the room were discovered 
clothing, jewelry, money, and business receipts, all of 
which belonged to the defendant (Tr.53,54,80). The proximi0l 
of the drugs to her own personal belongings would have been I 
-22-
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sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty even 
if she were shown to have had nonexclusive possession 
of the premises. 
POINT III 
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NOS. 1 AND 3 CONCERNING ACCESS TO OR 
EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF A ROOM WHERE NARCOTICS ARE FOUND. 
Among others the court gave the following 
instruction which focused primarily on the elements of 
the crime required by Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (Supp. 
1973), the statute under which the defendant was charged: 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 12. Before 
you can convict the defendant of the 
crime of UNLA\'7FUL POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE FOR VALUE, you must find 
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, all of the following elements 
of that crime: 
1. That on or about the 14th 
day of July, 1976, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the defendant, Willie 
Mae Walker, unlawfully possessed a 
controlled substance, namely, heroin. 
2. That such possession by 
defendant was intentional. 
3. That such controlled substance 
was knowingly possessed by defendant. 
4. That such possession of the 
controlled substance by the defendant 
was with the intent to distribute it 
for value. 
If you believe that the evidence 
establishes each and all of the essential 
elements of the offense beyond a reason-
able doubt, it is your duty to convict 
-23-
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the defendant. On the other hand, 
if the evidence has failed to so 
establish one or more of said 
elements then you should find the 
defendant not guilty." (R.71). 
The court, through Instruction 11, instructed 
the jury as to the legal definition of the word "possession" i 
in accordance with the definition give in Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-2 (26) (Supp. 1973): 
"The word 'possession' means 
the joint or individual ownership, 
control, occupancy, holding, retain-
ing, belonging, maintaining, obtaining, 
as distinguished from distribution, of 
controlled substances and includes 
individual, joint or group possession 
of controlled substances. For a person 
to be a possessor of a controlled 
substance, it is not required that 
he be shown to have individually 
possessed, the controlled substance, 
but it is sufficient if it is shown 
that he jointly participated with one 
or more persons in the possession of 
any substance with knowledge that such 
activity was occurring." (R.70). 
The general rule with regard to jury instructions 
I 
is that there is no grounds for reversal where the instructiorl 
was non-prejudicial and that if an error was committed, "A 
reasonable probability of a more favorable result, for 
defendant, in the absence of such error, must exist." 
State v. Hutcheson, No. 15390 (May 30, 1978); State v. 
Romeo, 42 Utah 46, 128 Pac. 530 (1912); State v. Condit, 
101 Utah 558, 125 P.2d 801 (1942). 
-24-
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The Court stated in State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 
113, 170 P.2d 153 (1946): 
it is the duty of the 
court to apply the law to the facts 
supported by the evidence and to not 
instruct on any question which is 
not involved in the case under the 
evidence." 170 P.2d at 162. 
The instructions which were given fairly addressed 
themselves to the facts of the case as were presented at the 
trial and supported by the evidence. The instructions 
proposed by the appellant were properly refused for several 
reasons: 
1. The language of appellant's proposed instruction 
does not focus on the facts supported by the evidence presented 
at the trial. Appellant's proposed Instruction No. 3 states: 
"The mere fact that Willie May 
Walker may have had access to the room 
where the heroin was found is insufficient 
evidence to prove that she had possession 
or control of the substance found therein." 
(R. 95). 
The weight of the evidence strongly suggests that 
defendant's access to the room was more than a "mere fact." 
The evidence presented as discussed in Point I shows that she 
did indeed have exclusive control of the room. Appellant's 
requested instructions would have had the effect of watering 
down the evidence presented and of confusing or misleading the 
jury. 
2. Appellant cited no case authority from Utah 
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showing that where others had access to a room in which 
narcotics are found the defendant cannot be found guilty 
of constructive possession. Courts across the nation have 
gone both ways on this issue and respondent would suggest 
as was shown in Point II(A), that the more reasonable theory I 
is the one which requires an examination of all the facts 
and circumstances of the case, and which allows for joint 
possession or control. The jury instruction which was 
given did allow for joint possession or control, in accord~a, 
with Utah statute. For the court to have given appellant's 
proposed jury Instruction Nos. 1 and 3 would have been to 
presume an interpretation of law which was not necessarily 
the correct one, and which avoided the facts supported by 
the evidence at the trial. 
There was no prejudicial error in the instructiom 
which were given and the verdict should not be disturbed. 
POINT IV 
THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE FROr1 THE UPPER 
FLOOR OF APPELLANT'S PREMISES WERE BOTH LAWFUL AND SUCH 
EVIDENCE SHOULD BE PERMITTED AT TRIAL. 
After swearing out a search warrant affidavit 
before Salt Lake City Judge M. D. Jones, the police officers 
went to the premises in question to conduct a search for 
illegally possessed heroin. The underlying basis of 
probable cause in the issuance of the search warrant supports 
three distinct circumstances of the search o£ the rooms on 
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the second floor: (a) since all the rooms were used by the 
occupants in a common or joint usage, the police officers 
were justified in searching the upper floor thoroughly; (b) 
neither the outward appearance of appellant's premises nor 
the licensing for hotel purposes were present so as to give 
the policemen prior notice of the upper floor's use; (c) 
searches must be judged according to what fair-minded persons 
would regard as proper in determining both if the search was 
valid and in assessing what is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment requirements. 
Before these three subpoints can be discussed, 
an initial foundation of the sufficiency of the search 
warrant's probable cause must be laid~ Where information from 
informants is used in securing a search warrant and the 
sufficiency of probable cause is in question, Jones v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), is regarded as setting forth the 
dispositive criteria for the supporting affidavit. Jones 
involved a search warrant for the suspected use of narcotics, 
the basis of which was information supplied by two informants. 
The affiant police officer had no personal knowledge of the 
use of drugs on the premises. The Supreme Court upheld the 
affidavit supporting the search warrant, ruling: 
"The question here is whether 
an affidavit which sets out personal 
observations relating to the existence 
of cause to search is to be deemed 
insufficient by virtue of the fact 
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.; 
that it sets out not the affiant's 
observations but those of another. 
An affidavit is not to be deemed 
insufficient on that score, so long 
as a substantial basis for crediting 
the hearsay is presented. 
In testing the sufficiency of 
probable cause for an officer's action 
even without a warrant, we have held 
that he may rely upon information 
received through an informant, rather 
than upon his direct observations, so 
long as the informant's statement is 
reasonably corroborated by other matters 
within the officer's knowledge." 362 
u.s. at 269. 
As to corroboration, the court further stated: 
"The informant had previously 
given accurate information. His story 
was corroborated by other sources of 
information. And petitioner was known 
by the police to be a user of narcotics. 
Corronoration through other sources of 
information reduced the chances of a 
reckless or prevaricating tale •••• " 
Id. at 271. 
This "substantial basis" test of Jones was accept~! 
in the Utah case of State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2dl 
846 (1972). The defendant in Treadway was convicted of 
unlawfully possessing marijuana. The basis for the search 
warrant involved was information phoned in by the manager of 
a motel who had observed the marijuana in the defendant's 
room. The affiant also swore that another officer had 
conducted a surveillance and believed the drugs were present. I 
I 
This Court found the affidavit was sufficient and enunciated 
the following standard: 
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"An affidavit may be based on 
hearsay information and need not reflect 
the direct, personal observations of the 
affiant; however, the magistrate must be 
informed of some of the underlying 
circumstances from which the affiant 
concluded that the informant was credible 
or his information reliable. The proba-
bility, and not a prima facie showing, of 
criminal activity is the standard of 
probable cause. The magistrate is 
obligated to render a judgment based 
upon a common-sense reading of the 
affidavit. Although the information is 
almost completely hearsay, the warrant 
may be upheld, if there be sufficient 
information in the affidavit to prove a 
'substantial basis' for crediting the 
hearsay." (Citations omitted.) 
Id. at 847-848. 
In accord, State v. Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977). 
The facts in the instant case satisfy the 
standards established by Jones and Treadway. That is, 
affiant George had a "substantial basis" for giving credit 
to the two confidential informants' observations regarding 
appellant's drug activities. The informants' past histories 
of supplying information which resulted in the arrest "of 
several felons" and providing "names, addresses and telephone 
numbers of known narcotics dealers, which information has 
subsequently been verified" support George's reliance on 
the information. (State's Exhibit A.) Affiant's state-
ments concerning the two informants' assertions were 
sufficient to allow a magistrate to find that the confiden-
tial sources were reliable and credible. 
-29-
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A. IT IS CLEAR THAT THERE WAS COMMON USAGE BY APP[ 
LANT 1 S ASSOCIATES AND ROOMERS OF ALL ROOMS ON THE SECOND FLOO! 
As was noted in the statement of facts, appellant 
was very generous in providing shelter for her friends and 
acquaintances. These occupants were allowed to inhabit 
the upper floor rooms with or without paying rent, depending 
on if the roomers had the money to pay rent {Tr.66,176-177). 
The open living room area and shared bathroom, kitchen and 
hallway facilities point to the common usage aspect of the 
second floor. 
The facts and circumstances of the search here are ~~ 
very similar to three cases in which search warrants were 
uphelc1. In State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 490 P.2d 334 (19711 
a search warrant was issued even though the affiant did not 
stipulate precisely whether the defendant was in possession 
of some alleged marijuana or whether defendant was indeed 
residing at the address listed on the warrant. Yet this 
Court ruled that the search which uncovered the suspected 
marijuana was proper. In assessing the validity of the 
search warrant, the court declared: 
" ••• it is not necessary that 
the affiant have certain knowledge 
of the commission of c1:ime or of the 
location of evidence incident thereto. 
It is only required that there be 
sufficient knowledge of the probability 
thereof that a person of reason and 
prudence would act thereon." 490 P.2d 
at 337. (Emphasis added.) 
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Thus, the Utah Court has ruled that the location 
of evidence to be seized is necessary in the warrant only 
to the extent that the affiant has "sufficient knowledge of 
the probability" that the evidence would be found on the 
premises. Certain knowledge is not the test. 
Here the confidential informants obtained informa-
tion that heroin was being used and sold on the upper floor 
of appellant's premises. The search warrant was based on 
that information and the "sufficient knowledge" test of 
~ was met. 
With respect to the common usage of the second 
floor rooms, the California Supreme Court ruled in People v. 
Gorg, 157 Cal.App.2d 515, 321 P.2d 143 (1958), that joint 
occupancy by criminal suspects will justify a search of all 
the rooms in the apartment. In Gorg, defendant and two 
other persons, Fontaine and Hyde, rented an apartment with 
three bedrooms but common bathroom, kitchen and living room. 
Each tenant paid rent separately to the landlord and shared 
utility expenses. The three bedrooms opened into the 
common living room. The warrant named Fontaine and authorized 
a search of "all rooms and buildings used in connection with 
the premises. Gorg appealed his conviction when 
incriminating evidence was uncovered in the search of the 
entire premise. In response to Gorg's claim that the search 
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was illegal, the California court determined that: 
"While a search warrant for 
one building on a tract of land 
occupied by a named person will not 
justify a search of another separate 
building on the same tract of land 
occupied by another person [citations 
omitted], and will not justify a 
search of a separate floor of the 
same building occupied by an unnamed 
tenant [citations omitted] such rule 
only applies where there are separate 
and distinct living quarters occupied 
by different persons. A rule of 
reason must be applied. Here the 
living unit was one distinct unit 
occupied by three persons. When the 
police, pursuant to the warrant, searched 
the living room and found marijuana, and 
then searched Fontaine's bedroom and 
found marijuana, they acted as reasonable 
and prudent men in searching the other two 
bedrooms that were unlocked and an integral 
art of the same livin uarters." 321 P.2d 
at 148. (Emphasis added. 
In the instant case, there were no separate and 
distinct living quarters (Tr.40), and, in fact, the upper 
floor area was one distinct living unit not only because 
of the numerous common areas shared by all the occupants, 
but also because appellant had control over the whole second 
floor (Tr.66,82-83). Thus, the Gorg ruling is very much 
on point here in that the police officers acted as prudent 
and reasonable men in searching all the rooms on the upper 
floor, especially since, as in Gorg, the rooms other than 
the officer were "unlocked and an integral part of the 
same living quarters." 
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One last case may be cited with regard to common 
occupancy. In Renner v. State, 187 Tenn. 647, 216 S.W.2d 
345 (1948), a suspected criminal and another person were 
sharing an upper floor consisting of five separate rooms 
at No. 1476 1/2 Market Street. Two rooms were rented to 
defendant and three rooms were rented to one McKinney. 
The court declared "parenthetically, that both parties 
seemed to make themselves at horne all over the place like 
one big family having a common interest." When defendant 
objected to the search warrant being incompetent on 
appeal, the court rejected his contention because: 
the warrant does not 
purport to confine the search to 
only that part of the described 
premises which is occupied by a 
specified person, .•• but purports 
to direct a search of all of 1476 1/2 
Market St. without regard to what 
person or persons may separately 
occupy separate portions of that 
address ••• It results that the 
description was sufficiently 
specific, if a search may validly be 
issued to search a specified premises 
without naming the person or persons in 
possession of the premises." 216 S.W.2d 
at 347. 
Just as the "sufficiently specific" requirement is 
set out by the Tennessee court, a similar test must be met 
in this state. Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-7 (Supp. 1973), declares 
that search warrants must describe the place to be searched 
with "reasonable particularity." In the present case, the 
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affidavit for search warrant gave adequate "reasonable 
particularity" when directing the search to be made of the 1 
premises located at 511-513 West Second South "adjoinding 
buildings known as Del's Cafe and rooms apurtenant thereto 
(State's Exhibit A), for the following reasons: 
the premises share a party wall and have only one entrance 
that allows access to both buildings; the two buildings are 
actually one single unit under the undivided control of 
appellant; even if there are one or more persons present in 
the unit it is immaterial without a showing that' such 
persons are tenants in the sense that they have a residence 
there exclusive of appellant's overriding control. This has 
not been shown by appellant. 
As is stated in 11 A.L.R.3d at 1341-42: 
"The general rule that a search 
warrant directed against a multiple-
occupancy structure must particularize 
respecting the subunit to be searched 
is usually held inapplicable where the 
premises in question are occupied by 
several families or persons in common 
rather than individually, or where it 
is shown that notwithstanding the joint 
occupancy, defendant was in control of 
the whole of the premises." 
It is respondent's position that the facts do not 
support the conclusion that the two buildings involved 
constitute a multi-occupancy dwelling as relied on by appellt\ 
in United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324 (C.A. 7, 1955), but I 
serve as a single unit controlled exclusively by one person I 
and for this reason the description in the search warrant 
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meets the particularity requirements of the Utah Code. 
As to the reference to the search of a male 
person known only as "Billie," whether this is an adequate 
description for the purpose of a lawful search of "Billie" 
has no relevance to the lawful search of the premises. 
The warrant's particularity and lawfulness will not stand 
or fall on the additional warrant purpose of the search 
of "Billie." Martini v. State, 200 Md. 609, 92 A.2d 456 
(1952); In ReG., 64 Misc.2d 129, 314 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1970). 
B. OUTWARD APPEARANCE DID NOT INDICATE NOR WAS 
THERE ANY LICENSE TO INDICATE THAT THE UPPER FLOOR WAS A 
HOTEL, APARTMENT BUILDING OR ROOMING HOUSE. 
It has been held that where the multi-unit 
character of the premises is not externally apparent and 
it was known to the officer applying for and executing 
the warrant, there is no requirement that the affidavit 
or search warrant specify the subunit to be searched. 
United States v. Santore, 290 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 
1952l,cert. den. 365 u.s. 834 (1960). In Santore, 
defendant contended that since the house which was 
searched was not a one-family house, but two-family--the 
basement and second floor being occupied by one family 
and the first floor by another--the warrant did not 
describe the premises with proper particularity. Defendant 
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moved to suppress all evidence because of a claimed illegal 
search and seizure. In rejecting the Hinton, supra, dis-
tinction, the court ruled: 
we think that the 
issued warrant described the premises 
to be searched with that 'practical 
accuracy' we have held to be necessary. 
[Citations omitted.] The description 
in the warrant was in accordance with 
the outward appearance of the stru~ture, 
[citations omitted] and in view of the 
concealment by Orlando [a co-defendant] 
of the interior alteration made by him 
it would be absurd to say that the 
Government was on notice as to it. 
The agents were not warned of a possible 
dual occupancy of the house until 
after they had shown the copy of the 
warrant to Orlando and had entered inside. 
At that moment it was too late for them, 
consistent with the success of their 
mission, to have retreated and obtained 
a new warrant." 290 F.2d at 67. 
In the present case, an inquiry to the Salt Lake 
City licensing and health departments would have revealed 
that no licenses existed for the operation of the premises 
as a dwelling for more than one family or person. As noted 
by appellant in her testimony at trial and in a deposition 
for affidavit in opposition to the search warrant, the 
premises had previously been used as a hotel, but the license I 
for such use had been allowed to lapse (Tr.l77;R.4). Thus, 
the police officers involved in the search should be allowed 
the justifiable inference that the premises were no longer 
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a multiunit structure and, in accordance with Santore, supra, 
should not be penalized for the description of the premises 
as set down in the search warrant. 
C. SEARCHES MUST BE JUDGED ACCORDING TO WHAT 
FAIR-MINDED PERSONS WOULD REGARD AS PROPER IN DETERMINING 
WHAT IS REASONABLE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENTS. 
A basic, common-sense standard has been established 
by this Court in determining whether searches are proper or 
not. In State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 
(1968), it was noted that courts should be wary of applying 
the principle of constitutional protection against unreason-
able searches too broadly. The Court determined that while 
unjustifiable searches were surely to be voided, as 
guaranteed by the Constitution: 
" ••• it is equally important 
that such protections be applied 
in circumstances they were intended 
to cover and that they do not become 
so extended beyond their reasons for 
being that even where there is no 
danger or likelihood of any such 
abuse, they provide a cloak of 
protection by which those engaged 
in criminal activities may escape 
detection and punishment. The 
essential thing is to keep within 
the reasonable middle ground, 
between the protecting of the 
law-abiding citizenry from high-
handed or officious intrusions into 
their private affairs; and the 
imposing of undue restrictions upon 
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conscientious officers doing their 
duty in the investigation of crime. 
It was undoubtedly in an awareness 
of the desirability of avoiding the 
difficulty just mentioned that the 
language of the Fourth Amendment does 
not denounce all searches, but only 
those which are 'unreasonable.' 
The question to be answered is 
whether under the circumstances the 
search or seizure is one which fair-
minded persons, knowing the facts, and 
giving due consideration to the 
Lights and interests of the public, 
as well as to those of the suspect, 
would judge to be an unreasonable 
or oppressive intrusion against the 
latter's rights." 444 P.2d at 519. 
This same reasoning 1vas echoed again by this Court 
in State v. Richards, 26 Utah 2d 318, 489 P.2d 422 (1971); 
State v. Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 73, 513 P.2d 435 (1973); State v. 
Farnsworth, 30 Utah 2d 435, ~J 9 P.2d 244 (1974); State v. 
Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976); and State v. Folkes, 565 
P. 2d 1125 (Utah 1977). 
In the instant case, neither the magistrate who 
approved the warrant nor the trial judge considered the 
search to be unreasonable. In light of the Criscola test, 
such determination should be given great weight when the 
validity of the warrant is questioned by appellant on appeal. I 
I 
POINT V 
EVIDENCE MAY PROPERLY BE SEIZED WHEN IN THE COURSE 
OF A LEGAL SEARCH OFFICERS INADVERTENTLY COME ACROSS 
INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE IN PLAIN VIEW. 
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The envelopes found in appellant's office 
were ancillary evidence further establishing that she 
was the occupant of the room where the heroin was 
discovered (Tr.41,66-69). While the envelopes were 
not listed on the search warrant as items to be seized, 
the case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 u.s. 443 
(1971), holds that there are specific circumstances 
when unlisted items may be taken as evidence. Coolidge 
notes that while police may seize evidence in plain view 
without a warrant, it is crucial that such "plain view" 
seizures be allowed only within a very narrow framework. 
After the Supreme Court listed the two constitutional 
objectives of search warrant requirements--magistrate's 
scrutiny to eliminate searches not based on adequate 
probable cause and the limitation of searches so as to 
avoid the abhorrent "general search"--the court ruled: 
[t]he plain view' doctrine 
is not in conflict with the first 
objective because plain vievT does not 
occur until a search is in progress. 
In each case, this initial intrusion 
is justified by a warrant or by an 
exception such as 'hot pursuit' or 
search incident to a lawful arrest, 
or by an extraneous valid reason for 
the officer's presence. And, given 
the initial intrusion, the seizure 
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of an object in plain view is 
consistent with the second 
objective, since it does not con-
vert the search into a general or 
exploratory one. As against the 
minor peril to Fourth Amendment 
protections, there is a major gain 
in effective law enforcement. lvhere, 
once an otherwise lawful search is 
in progress, the police inadvertently 
come upon a piece of evidence, it would 
often be a needless inconvenience, 
and sometimes dangerous--to the evidence 
or to the police themselves--to require 
them to ignore it until they have obtained 
a warrant particularly describing it." 
403 u.s. at 467-468. 
Thus, Coolidge allows "plain view" incriminating 
evidence to be seized if a lawful search is already under 
way. This was clearly the case in the present matter at 
bar, since the envelopes were discovered in the same 
nightstand where the heroin was found. (Tr.66-69). 
This Court has upheld the "plain view" theory in 
the recent case of State v. Folkes, supra. Here a criminal 
activity of illegal drug use was observed by two policemen · 
I 
who proceeded to arrest the suspects and gather incriminating 
I 
evidence. This Court held the police officers: 
could take anything in 
the immediate area which was so 
involved in the criminal conduct 
that it would serve as evidence in 
proof of the crime. Though the 
bottle from which the narcotic had 
been taken was placed on the dresser 
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in the adjoining bedroom, it was in 
the immediate vicinity; and it was in 
plain view in that no search was 
required to discover it. In fact 
the charge that there was a 'search' 
in this case is for that reason 
a distortion of language, because 
there was really no 'search' involved." 
565 P.2d at 1127-1128. 
A parallel can be drawn to the present case: 
the envelopes were seized in the "immediate vicinity" of 
the 56 balloons of heroin; the envelopes would serve as 
"evidence in proof of the crime" (i.e., possession); and 
the envelopes were in "plain view in that no search was 
required to discover [them]." 
The Utah Court has also upheld this "plain view" 
rationale in State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 2d 129, 499 P.2d 
276 (1972); State v. Allred, 16 Utah 2d 41, 395 P.2d 535 
(1964); State v. Martinez, 28 Utah 2d 80, 498 P.2d 651 
(1972); and State v. Kaae, supra. 
Another important aspect of the envelope's 
admissibility is the United States Supreme Court's 
determination that there is no basis in distinguishing 
"mere evidence" seized in a la>vful search from fruits 
or instrumentalities of crime or contraband. Warden v. 
Hayden, 387 u.s. 294 (1964). The Court there ruled: 
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[n]othing in the 
language of the Fourth Amendment 
supports the distinction between 
'mere evidence' and instrumentalities, 
fruits of crime, or contraband. On 
its face, the provision assures the 
'right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects ••• ,'without regard to the 
use to which any of these things are 
applied. This 'right of the people' is 
certainly unrelated to the 'mere evidence' 
limitation. Privacy is disturbed no 
more by a search directed to a purely 
evidentiary object than it is by a search 
directed to an instrumentality, fruit, or 
contraband." 387 U.S. at 301-302. 
This same rationale 1r1as used in State v. Jones, 
202 Kansas 31, 446 P.2d 851 (1968), where the seizure of a 
handkerchief with the defendant's monogrammed initial on 
it was deemed proper because it was "lying in close proximity 
to the • 32 caliber pistol" (which was used in the commission 
of a murder). The court rejected defendant's claim that the 
handkerchief was "mere evidence" and should therefore be 
excluded. The Kansas high court held that "the mere evidence : 
rule was never the law in Kansas • • • and the Supreme Court 
of the United States recently abandoned the mere evidence 
rule in Warden v. Hayden." 446 P.2d at 866. 
The seizure of the handkerchief in Jones and the 
seizure of the envelopes in the instant case are most 
analogous. Both were discovered in "close proximity" to 
the crucial evidence (i.e., pistol in Jones and heroin in 
the present case) and both linked the defendants to the 
--
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crime. Respondent submits further that both were properly 
seized within the scope of the searches. The envelopes 
were important bridging evidence which were in plain view 
during the course of the legal search and were properly 
seized to afix appellant's control over the office where 
the incriminating heroin was found. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent contends that there was sufficient 
evidence presented at the tiral upon which the jury could 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
guilty of unlawful possession of heroin. The weight of the 
evidence showed that she had exclusive control over the 
room in which the heroin was discovered on July 14, 1976. 
The testimony of James Housley regarding the previous 
occupation of that room by Robert Westley was properly 
excluded by the judge, since Housley was unable to say 
exactly when he had visited the premises and seen Westley. 
The trial judge properly used his discretion in 
refusing to allow that testimony since it might have 
confused the issues or misled the jury had it been permitted. 
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to 
give the defendant's proposed Instruction Nos. l and 3. 
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Even if an error had been committed there was no reasonable 
probability that a decision more favorable to the defendant 
would have resulted. There was no error on the part of 
the judge. 
The search conducted of the upper floor rooms 
was a proper action by the police officers since all the 
rooms were under appellant's control, no prior indication 
was given the officers regarding the unlicensed use of the 
seconn floor as a rooming house and the search was reason-
able and fair under the circumstances. 
The two envelopes seized were clearly in "plain 
view" and were properly gathered as incriminating evidence 
against appellant. They were also in "close proximity" 
to the seized heroin. 
Respondent asserts that the rulings of the lower 
court were proper and prays that the decision be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
MICHAEL L. DEM1ER 
Deputy Attorney General 
WILLIAI'l W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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